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Abstract
This study investigates the efficiency and effectiveness of area-based trad-
able credit scheme (TCS) based on the trip-based Macroscopic Fundamental
Diagram model for the morning commute problem. In the proposed tradable
credit scheme, the regulator distributes initial credits to all travelers and de-
signs a time-varying and trip length specific credit tariff. Credits are traded
between travelers and the regulator, and the credit price is determined by
the demand and supply of credits. The heterogeneity of travelers is consid-
ered in terms of desired arrival time, trip length and departure-time choice
preferences. The TCS is incorporated into a day-to-day modelling frame-
work to examine the travelers’ learning process and the evolution of network
and credit market properties. The existence of the equilibrium solution and
the uniqueness of the credit price at equilibrium state are established an-
alytically. Furthermore, a open-source simulation framework is developed
to showcase the analytical properties of the proposed TCS and compare it
with alternative control strategies in terms of mobility, network and social
welfare performance. Bayesian optimization is then adopted to optimize the
credit toll scheme. The numerical results demonstrate that the proposed
TCS outperforms the no-control case and matches the performance of the
time-of-day pricing strategy, while maintaining its revenue-neutral nature.
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1. Introduction
Road traffic externalities are a serious problem that affects urban trans-
portation networks worldwide. Its severity continues to increase imposing
significant costs on the traveler, environment, economy, and society. While
traditional solutions on the supply side based on building extra roads are
proven to be counterproductive [25], demand management solutions have
not yet been explored fully in an operational setting, either being price or
quantity control instruments.
Since the profound work by Pigou [40], congestion pricing (CP) has
received a great deal of attentions over a century in both theory and practice
sustained by its potential gains in social welfare [32]. Nevertheless, this price
instrument often receives political and social resistance as it is perceived
as a tax [38]. For this reason researchers have been exploring in recent
years alternative and more appealing demand management solutions, such
as the tradable credit scheme (TCS) [14, 21, 13]. A typical TCS system
has the following features [14]: 1) the total quota of credits available in the
study area is predetermined; 2) a regulator provides an initial endowment
of credits to all potential travelers; 3) the credits can be bought and sold in
a market that is monitored by the regulator at a price that is determined
by demand and supply interactions; 4) in order to use a transportation
system, travelers need to spend a certain number of credits (i.e., tariff) that
could vary with the conditions of the specific mobility alternative used; 5)
enforcement is necessary to ensure the permits being consumed or traded
validly. Consequently, the TCS is a revenue-neutral and equitable demand
management scheme with high public acceptance [44, 39].
Recently, several researchers have studied the modeling of the TCS con-
sidering the static traffic equilibrium in terms of flow pattern and credit
market price. For example, Yang and Wang [49] demonstrated that for
a given link-specific credit charge scheme (i.e., a credit toll vector), the
equilibrium link flow pattern is unique under standard assumptions, and
the credit price is also unique under an additional mild assumption (i.e.,
there are at least two paths with different credit tariffs connecting the same
origin-destination pair in the equilibrium path set). Xiao et al. [48] proved
that the optimal time-varying charge of credits at the bottleneck always
exists under the assumption that late arrival is prohibited. Miralinaghi and
Peeta [37] developed a multi-period TCS to guarantee a stable credit price.
The numerical results for a general network demonstrated that by setting
a penalty on transferring credits from one period to future period and a
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credit recycling price, the credit price becomes less volatile. de Palma et al.
[39] compared a standard TCS with a congestion pricing in terms of social
welfare, using a network containing two travel modes, i.e., highways with
route-specific tolls (in either dollars or credits) and public transport with a
zero toll. The analytical analysis and numerical results showed that TCS
is equivalent to pricing under fully adaptive tolls, but outperforms it under
non-adaptive tolls typically when the congestion function is relatively steep
compared to the demand function. Bao et al. [3] clarified that the equi-
librium related to credit price and departure rate of the bottleneck model
with a TCS is not unique and proved the uniqueness using an alternative
congestion model developed by Chu [10], where travel time only relates to
the arrival rate when the trip is completed.
Despite the existing research focusing on the network equilibrium at a
static level, only a very limited number of studies investigated the dynamics
of credit price and traveler behaviors at the individual level. Ye and Yang
[50] incorporated the path choice model and day-to-day learning model un-
der a given TCS to reveal the dynamic evolution process of traffic flow and
credit price. Very recently, Brands et al. [6] empirically tested the market of
a TCS through a lab-in-the-field experiment where participants make virtual
travel choices and real transactions in a tradable parking permits setting.
The results showed that the designed market achieved credit prices within
a desired range, and the number of bought and sold quantities kept close
to each other, supporting the theoretical market equilibrium. Also recently,
and aiming towards a TCS closer to practice, [9] modelled the detailed and
joint individual decision making (namely, the buying, selling and departure
time choices) together with the regulators operations in a microscopic time-
based simulation framework. Under this setting, the authors proposed a
market model with desirable stability and equilibrium properties and com-
pared against a time of day pricing control and the no-control case under
different demand magnitudes. Ultimately, and in the absence of empirical
evidence, these few existing contributions point to known state-of-the-art
day-to-day learning frameworks for capturing some of the demand-supply
interactions. Indeed, different day-to-day models have been developed in
recent years to evaluate other traffic control strategies, such as: Cantarella
et al. [8] whom studied the impact of different bus operating strategies
and travelers’ choices within a day-to-day dynamic process; Guo et al. [22]
whom investigated the properties of the day-to-day dynamic traffic flows in
a general network under a congestion price; or Yildirimoglu and Ramezani
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[51] whom proposed departure time allocation optimization under both a
day-to-day and a within-day framework. All these frameworks are often
extremely helpful in assuring the desirable equilibrium proprieties in dis-
aggregate modelling frameworks of demand-supply interactions, as it is for
the TCS schemes at stake in this paper.
If on the demand side, it is reported that both detailed market inter-
actions and day-to-day learning processes are still to be explored by re-
searchers, general and toy networks with link-based credit charging have
prevailed in most studies, thus also limiting the design towards practice-
ready TCS [31]. In this paper we proposed to evaluate TCS under a sin-
gle reservoir network using the Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD)
[11, 19]. We argue that for potential area-based implementations of TCS,
the studty of the scheme’s proprieties under an MFD setting may facili-
tate its design and operation. Early MFD applications, such as [2, 17],
show-cased the quantification of potential congestion benefits under quan-
tity control schemes by keeping the accumulation no greater than the flow-
maximizing value. The consideration of individual attributes like heteroge-
neous trip length was considered in [2, 15, 12, 28], where a reformulation
of the computation for trip length is developed, henceforward referred to
as trip-based MFD. There are basically three advantages of utilizing the
trip-based MFD model: 1) Compared to the traditional MFD model (or
accumulation-based MFD model [30]), where the predicted outflow increases
instantaneously when there is a sharp increase in the inflow, trip-based MFD
model accounts for a reaction time to the sudden change in demand and
computes the outflow only considering travelers who have completed their
trips, providing more reliable results [34]; 2) Trip-based MFD model is able
to accommodate a more realistic heterogeneity of individual travelers in
terms of trip length, desired arrival time and schedule deviation penalties
[29]; and 3) the trip-based MFD model allows for testing distance-based
TCS schemes, ultimately bringing additional fairness and efficiency degrees
of freedom to the scheme’s design process Daganzo and Lehe [12].
Moreover, a proper design of credit charging scheme is required to make
the TCS effective in demand management. The system optimal credit
scheme are usually derived analytically when dealing with the traffic equilib-
rium at a static level (e.g., Yang and Wang [49], de Palma et al. [39] for link-
specific credit toll, and Xiao et al. [48], Bao et al. [3] for time-varying credit
toll). However, it is not easy to analytically obtain the charging scheme that
minimizing the system cost for day-to-day dynamic choice (e.g., departure
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time) modelling problems. Though some efforts are devoted to find the
link-specific congestion pricing toll to reach a desired equilibrium [23, 33],
or to minimize the system cost [43], it is still changeable to acquire the
time-varying charging scheme. Chen et al. [9] proposed to use a Gaussian
(mixture) function to parameterize the time-varying credit charge scheme,
which facilitates the adoption of derivative-free optimization methods, such
as evolution algorithms, pattern search and Bayesian optimization.
This paper incorporates the TCS and the trip-based MFD model into a
day-to-day modelling framework to investigate the properties of the equi-
librium solutions and the performance of the TCS at the network level.
As proposed in [9], the framework is then applied to the (departure-time
choice) morning commute problem and used to evaluate welfare, network
and traveler-specific performance changes. More specifically, the contribu-
tions of this paper are three-fold: (1) The day-to-day model is integrated
with the trip-based MFD model under a TCS, wherein the credit charge
rate is time-varying and length-specific, and the credit price is day-to-day
dynamic. (2) The analytical properties of the proposed dynamic system
are established, including the existence of the equilibrium solution and the
uniqueness of the credit price at equilibrium state. (3) As the proposed
day-to-day model is essentially a simulation with an expensive-to-evaluate
objective function when dealing with a large number of travelers, Bayesian
Optimization (BO) is adopted to optimize the credit charge scheme (which
is referred to as toll profile) to maximize the social welfare. (4) A sim-
ulation framework is also presented to showcase the analytical properties
and evaluate the TCS performance against the case without TCS and the
time-of-day pricing case.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the mod-
eling assumptions, traffic flow model, day-to-day dynamic model and credit
price evolution model. Section 3 discusses the properties of the dynamic
system, i.e., the existence of the equilibrium solution and the uniqueness of
the credit price at equilibrium state. Section 4 introduces the BO approach
to optimize the parameters associated with the toll profile function. Then
the numerical simulation results are shown in Section 5. Finally, conclusions
are summarized in Section 6.
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2. Methodology
2.1. Characteristic analysis and modeling assumptions
In a morning commute problem, travelers are assumed to choose their
departure times based on the travel time and schedule delay (the differ-
ence between the actual arrival time and desired arrival time) costs Vickrey
[45]. In this paper, we follow the early philosophy in modelling the morn-
ing commute problem with area-based networks as a reservoir [11, 20] and
investigate its properties under a TCS control. Note that in such modelling
framework the assumption that the traffic congestion is spatially uniformly
distributed within the network holds [11].
First, we present here key model definitions regarding the network, trav-
elers’ behavior and credit price that are essential for the remainder mod-
elling and analysis.
Network : A single-reservoir network [11, 19] is considered in this study,
where all trips originate and end within this network. The idea is to describe
the aggregate vehicular accumulation, the number of operating vehicles, at
the ”neighborhood” level with a well-defined relationship between the reser-
voir outflow and the aggregate accumulation. Furthermore, we will resort
to the trip-based MFD as in [2, 15, 12, 28] and whose general properties are
described in 2.2 and further investigated in [34].
Traveler : Each traveler (in a vehicle) is simulated as an individual agent.
The initial travel plan of each agent consists of departure time, trip length
and desired arrival time. In the day-to-day process, departure time can
change within a fixed time-window, and a logit discrete choice model fol-
lowing [4] framework is used (see 2.3.1. The time-based attributes of the
alternatives considered rely on the previous experienced attributes and the
historical perception by each individual [41] as detailed in 2.3.2.
TCS : The TCS explored in this paper follows the design proposed by
[3, 6, 9]: 1) The regulator will give out the same amount of credits to every
traveler in each day. 2) All travelers are assumed to trade directly with the
regulator so that travelers who are short of credits can buy enough credits
to pay the tariff, and travelers who have excess credits can sell them. 3)
The tariff charging profile (i.e., the time-varying toll in credits) is designed
by the regulator in advance and keeps invariant across the entire day-to-day
process. Here, the optimal design of the toll profile is obtained using BO,
further detailed in 4.2.
Credit price: As the credit is freely bought and sold in a market, the price
is determined by credit demand-supply interactions [49, 50]. Specifically,
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the supply of credits is predetermined by the regulator while the demand
or consumption of credits is governed by the credit toll profile and the
traffic flow generated from the executed travel plans of all the agents. The
difference between the supply and demand determines the current credit
price, which in turn influences the evaluations of agents (as detailed in
Section 2.3.3).
Given the definitions above, the following assumptions were made in the
formulation of our model:
Assumption 1. Each traveler has his/her own desired arrival time, trip
length and schedule deviation early/late penalty coefficient. This assump-
tion ensures heterogeneity within travelers, which can also be accommo-
dated by the trip-based MFD model as it computes the travelled distance
of all travelers separately. Note that the size of the departure time choice
set is the same for all travelers. The straightforward relaxation of this as-
sumption should still be tested in the future.
Assumption 2. The utility specification in the individual logit discrete
choice model has a simple formulation with the travel time, schedule devia-
tion penalty, toll credit payment as attributes, along with and the random
utility term [4, 5].
Assumption 3. In the day-to-day process, when evaluating the utilities
of the not-chosen alternatives (and thus not experienced), the attributes
used are those estimated for the previous day when a traveler would enter
the network, thus not influencing the accumulation of the network (i.e.
fictional traveler travel times in Lamotte and Geroliminis [27]).
Assumption 4. The buying and selling behaviors are not explicitly
modelled in this study, as in contrast with Chen et al. [9]. Thus, the het-
erogeneous preferences on the credit market or known behaviors existing
in tradable markets like credit stocking and banking are not considered.
Specifically, in each day after selecting a departure time, a traveler has to
pay a credit toll according to the toll profile function and her/his trip-length.
If the traveler is short of credits, she/he can only buy credits needed for the
payment directly from the regulator; otherwise, she/he will sell extra credits
to the regulator at the market price. This implies that each traveler only
has one trade in each day and his/her credit account balance should be 0
at the end of each day. This assumption is commonly adopted in previ-
ous research [49, 47, 6]. It is expected that complex and strategic buying
and selling behaviors will affect credit price evolution [13, 9] through both
the credit value perception and the credit effective demand and supply. A
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common way to avoid the speculation is to set a specific validity period;
then no one can benefit from credit stocking and banking behaviors [38]. In
this study, the validity period is set as one day. Besides, the aforementioned
end-of-day ”traveler-to-regulator” trading has a main disadvantage that the
budget neutrality of credits is not guaranteed [6]. A possible solution could
be setting a cap for the supply of credits from the regulator.
Assumption 5. To set up a time-varying credit charge scheme, the
toll function is assumed to take a (positive) Gaussian function, which is
controlled by three parameters, mean, variance and amplitude. Without
loss of generality the method described below can be extended to a Gaussian
mixture function to allow for asymmetric and more flexible toll profiles.
Under the above assumptions, the detailed model formulation that fol-
lows relies on the notation presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Modelling Notations
Notations Definition
i Index of a traveler
d Index of a simulated day
Ii,d Number of credits distributed to traveler i on day d
D Total number of days
N Total number of travelers
Li Trip length of traveler i
w Scale factor of trip length
θi Value of time for traveler i
SDEi\SDLi Schedule deviation penalty for early\late arrival for traveler i
tdepi,d Departure time of traveler i on day d
τ Time window size parameter
∆t Step-size of departure time
TWi Departure time window for traveler i,
TWi = {tdepi,0 − τ ·∆t, tdepi,0 − (τ − 1) ·∆t, . . . , tdepi,0 + τ ·∆t}
n(t) Number of travelers in the network at time t
V (n) Network’s average travel speed with n travelers
T ∗i Desired arrival time of traveler i
Ti,d(t) Experienced (or estimated) travel time for traveler i on day d
departing at time t
ci,d(t) Experienced (or estimated) generalized cost for traveler i on day d
departing at time t
Ci,d(t) Perceived generalized cost for traveler i on day d departing at time t
δi Binary variable, δi = 1 if t+ Ti,d(t) < T
∗
i , otherwise δi = 0
ω Learning parameter for the generalized cost in the day-to-day process
pd Credit price on day d
Toll(t) Number of credits charged per trip length unit at time t
2.2. Trip-based MFD model
As defined in [28, 34], the general principle of the trip-based MFD is that
the trip length of traveler i is computed as the integration of the speed from
the entering time tdepi to the exiting time t
dep
i + Ti(t
dep
i ), which is written as
follows,
Li =
∫ tdepi +Ti(tdepi )
tdepi
V (n(t))dt (1)
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Without loss of generality, notation tdepi is used instead of t
dep
i,d in Equa-
tion (1). The assumption that the V (n(t))) is the same for all travelers in
the neighborhood-like network and only changes when an event (departure
or arrival) often requires the use of event-based simulation for analysing
network proprieties [34, 51]. In this paper we follow the simulation process
below:
Algorithm 1 Event-based simulation of the trip-based MFD
Step 1. Initialization: Input tdepi , T
∗
i , Li, speed-MFD function V (n) =
P (n)/n and number of travelers N ; set n = 0, event counter j = 0, tj = 0;
calculate the initially estimated arrival time for all travelers ∀i, 1...N by
Li/V (0) using Equation (1).
Step 2. Construct the event list by appending the departure and arrival in
the order of time, which should have a length of 2N .
Step 3. Calculate the experienced travel time:
While Event list is not empty:
set j = j + 1
set tj as the time of the next event to tj−1
let Li = Li − V (n) · (tj − tj−1), ∀i
if the next closest event is a traveler i′ departure:
n = n+ 1, update the credit account balance of traveler i
else:
n = n− 1, compute the experienced travel time of traveler i′, Ti′(tdepi′ )
end if
Remove this event from the event list
Update the current average travelling speed V (n)
Update the estimated arrival time for all travelers ∀i, 1...N by using Equa-
tion (1)
Sort the event list in the order of time
End while
2.3. Travel behavior model and and credit price evolution
2.3.1. Travelers’ departure time choice
On day d, the utilities of the discrete departure time choice for traveler
i has the following formulation:
Ui,d(t) = Ci,d(t) + i (2)
where i is an identically and independently distributed error term; and
Ci,d(t) is the systematic utility, i.e. the perceived cost of traveler i departing
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at time t on day d, further detailed in Section 2.3.2. The probability of
choosing departure time t can be calculated according to the logit model as
follows:
Pri,d(t) =
exp
(
µ · Ci,d(t)
)∑
s∈TWi exp
(
µ · Ci,d(s)
) (3)
where µ > 0 is the scale parameter, reflecting the variance of the unobserved
portion of utility, with choices being random for scale parameter equal to
zero and deterministic as its value approaches infinity [41, 5].
2.3.2. Travelers’ learning process
Under a given TCS, the generalized cost for traveler i on day d departing
at time t consists of three parts: travel time cost, schedule deviation penalty
and credit payment. More specifically, we formulate a money metric utility
as:
ci,d(t) =− θi ·
[
Ti,d(t) + δi · SDEi ·
(
T ∗i − t− Ti,d(t)
)
+
(1− δi) · SDLi ·
(
t+ Ti,d(t)− T ∗i
)]− pd · Toll(t) · Li · w
=− θi · tci,d(t)− pd · Toll(t) · Li · w
(4)
where θi is the value of time for traveler i, Ti,d(t) is the travel time for
traveler i on day d departing at time t, SDEi and SDLi are the schedule
deviation penalty parameters for early and late arrival for traveler i, and
δi is a binary variable that equals 1 if i arrives early and 0 otherwise. For
simplicity we also formulate tci,d as the time related component of the utility,
i.e. the travel time cost and the schedule deviation penalty. Note that
with Algorithm 1, only the travel time for the chosen departure time can
be measured by a particular traveler i. In order to estimate the travel
time for all other unchosen departure times in the choice set TWi, fictional
travelers are assumed to choose these departure time without influencing
the accumulation of the network [27]. The credit payment of traveler i is
the product of credit price pd, credit toll Toll(t), trip length Li and the scale
factor w, where w is needed for scaling down the magnitude of trip length
to avoid unrealistic large payment.
At the end of each day d, travelers update their perception of the gener-
alized costs for day d+1, combining the initially perceived generalized costs
on day d with the experienced (chosen alternative) and estimated (unchosen
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alternatives) generalized costs on day d, as follows:
Ci,d+1(t) = ω · Ci,d(t) + (1− ω) · ci,d(t) (5)
where 0 < ω < 1 is the learning parameter. The learning rate implies the
weight of previously measured cost [24]. A larger learning rate means a
higher influence of historical perceived costs. In this study, all travelers are
assumed to have the identical learning rate ω.
2.3.3. Credit price evolution
It is common that the price in a free market is determined by the re-
lationship between supply and demand, that the price should increase or
reduce when the demand is beyond or below the supply. In this study, it
is assumed that the credit price on day d + 1 is based on the previous day
credit price pd and the observed excess credit consumption Zd, defined as
the difference between the credit consumption and the total endowment of
credits in a given day. The endowment is assumed to be the same for all
travelers and constant across days. Thus,
Zd =
∑
i
Toll(tdepi,d ) · Li · w − Ii,d ·N (6)
pd+1 = pd +Q(pd, Zd) (7)
where the change of price is represented by function Q.
Function Q(p, Z) needs to satisfy the following assumptions to guarantee
a non-negative price p: 1) ∀p > 0, Q(p, Z) is strictly increasing with Z ∈ R;
2) If p = 0, Q(0, Z) is strictly increasing with Z ≥ 0; 3) Q(p, 0) = 0, ∀p ≥ 0;
Q(0, Z) = 0, ∀Z ≤ 0. Then we have
Q(p, Z) = 0⇐⇒ p · Z = 0, p ≥ 0, Z ≤ 0 (8)
3. Solution analysis
This section builds on the work of Ye and Yang [50], who showed that
the equilibrium point of the price and flow dynamics under a TCS in a route
choice problem is unique and stable.
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3.1. Solutions to the day-to-day model
When the proposed day-to-day model reaches equilibrium, the total
number of consumed credits should not exceed the total number of endowed
credits, which can be written as follows:
lim
d→D
∑
i
Toll(tdepi,d ) · Li · w ≤ I ·N (9)
where Ii,d is simplified as I as it is identical among travelers and constant
across days.
As the credit toll profile within the peak hour period is predetermined
and keeps constant across days, it allows for the calculation of the theoretical
minimum consumption of credits for all travelers. Then the dynamic system
will be self-adaptive to the credit endowment, as long as the feasibility
condition that credit endowment is not smaller than the minimum demand
is satisfied.
3.2. Existence of the equilibrium point and uniqueness of the price
For the proposed dynamic system, the equilibrium point Ci,∗(t) means
the departure time decisions do not change across days, i.e., when the sys-
tem comes to Ci,∗(t), it will remain at Ci,∗(t) for all future times. By the
definition, the equilibrium condition for this system is:{
Ci,∗(t) = ωCi,∗(t) + (1− ω) · [θi · tci,∗(t) + p∗ · Toll(t) · Li · w]
p∗ = p∗ +Q(p∗, Z∗)
(10)
which is equivalent to{
Ci,∗(t) = θi · tci,∗(t) + p∗ · Toll(t) · Li · w
Q(p∗, Z∗) = 0
(11)
We can then introduce the following two theorems for the existence of
the equilibrium point and the uniqueness of the price.
Theorem 1 If I ·N > Imin ·N , limp→∞
∑
i Toll(t
dep
i,d ) · Li · w, then there
exists at least one equilibrium point (Ci,∗, p∗) of the proposed dynamic sys-
tem.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is detailed in Appendix A. It is directly
inspired from a proof of Ye and Yang [50]. 
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Theorem 2 Assume the minimum credit endowment condition is satisfied,
if the total credit demand,
∑
i Toll(t
dep
i,∗ ) · Li · w, is strictly decreasing with
with credit price, i.e.,
(p1 − p2)
(∑
i
Toll(tdep1i,∗ ) · Li · w −
∑
i
Toll(tdep2i,∗ ) · Li · w
)
< 0 (12)
where tdep1i,∗ and t
dep2
i,∗ is the departure time of traveler i under price p1 and
p2, respectively, then the equilibrium price is unique.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is detailed in Appendix B. 
Remark 1. Notes on the conditions for inequality (12) to hold:
1) There is at least two departure times with different credit charges.
This condition holds as the credit toll is time-varying.
2) According to equation (3), for each traveler i, the probability of choos-
ing departure time t, Pri(t) = Pri(Ci(t)) takes the logit form, thus the
following conditions are satisfied:
i)
∂Pri(Ci(t))
∂Ci(t)
< 0 ∀t ∈ TWi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
ii)
∂Pri(Ci(t1))
∂Ci(t2)
> 0 ∀t1, t2 ∈ TWi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
iii)
∂Pri(Ci(t1))
∂Cj(t2)
= 0 ∀t1 ∈ TWi, t2 ∈ TWj, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
iv)
∂Pri(Ci(t1))
∂Ci(t2)
=
∂Pri(Ci(t2))
∂Ci(t1)
∀t1, t2 ∈ TWi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
v)
∑
t′∈TWi
Pri(Ci(t
′)) = 1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
3) Let JPr be the Jacobian matrix of Pr(·) with regard to Ci(t) =
(Ci(t
′), t′ ∈ TWi). It can be proved that JPr is negative semidefinite as
condition 2) is satisfied and the systematic utility is a non-increasing func-
tion of the corresponding perceived cost (see details in [7, 50]). According
to the property of semidefinite matrix, we have Toll · JPr · TollT ≤ 0,
where Toll = (Li ·w · Toll(t′), t′ ∈ TWi). The equality holds if and only if
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condition 1) is not satisfied. Thus the following inequality holds:
(p1 − p2)
(
Pr(Ci(t|p1))TollT − Pr(Ci(t|p2))TollT
)
=(p1 − p2)
( ∑
t∈TWi
Pri(Ci(t|p1)) · Toll(t) · Li · w−∑
t∈TWi
Pri(Ci(t|p2)) · Toll(t) · Li · w
)
<0
(13)
In inequality (13),
∑
t∈TWi Pri(Ci(t|p1)) ·Toll(t) ·Li ·w is the expected value
of the credit toll paid by traveler i with credit price p1. According to the
weak law of large numbers, we can substitute the summation term by the
credit toll paid by traveler i departing at the equilibrium departure time
tdep1i,∗ with credit price p1. Then inequality (12) holds. 
Inequality (12) can also be interpreted that under the logit form choice
probability function, when the credit price goes up, the departure time that
associates with a relative high toll is less likely to be chosen and the credit
consumption is supposed to decrease.
Then, it is reasonable to propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 p∗ is decreasing with Ii in interval (Imin, IUE], where Imin
is defined in Section 3.1, and IUE is the average credit consumption for
equilibrium pattern without TCS. Besides, p∗ = 0 when Ii ≥ IUE.
A similar hypothesis is analytically proved in [50], where the TCS is
applied to a link-based network congestion model, instead, we will validate
this hypothesis by simulations in Section 5.
4. Simulation-based optimization framework
4.1. Framework
In this study, the social welfare per capita W at the equilibrium state
is adopted to measure the performance of scenarios with and without TCS.
First, in the no toll case (or NTE, the scenario without TCS), the social
welfare per capita WNTE is the consumer surplus (CS) for each traveler,
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i.e., the sum of observed travel utilities Ui,d(t
dep
i,d ), including travel time cost,
schedule deviation penalty and random utility, which is written as
WNTE =CS =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ui,d(t
dep
i,d )
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
− θi ·
(
Ti,d(t
dep
i,d ) + δi · SDEi ·
(
T ∗i − tdepi,d − tti,d(tdepi,d )
)
+
(1− δi) ·
(
tdepi,d + tti,d(t
dep
i,d )− T ∗i
))
+ i(t
dep
i,d )
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
− θi · tci,d(tdepi,d ) + i(tdepi,d )
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
U ′i,d(t
dep
i,d )
(14)
where d is the day when the system reaches the equilibrium.
For TCS scenario, the social welfare is computed as the sum of the
CS, the traveler revenue (TR) from unused credits, the regulator revenue
(RR) from credit toll collection, the regulator cost (RC) from buying unused
credits and the value of the travel endowment (TE). Let φi,d(t
dep
i,d ) represent
the number of credits sold by traveler i on day d, ψi,d(t
dep
i,d ) denote the
number of credits bought by traveler i on day d, and Tollei,d(t
dep
i,d ) denote the
number of credits paid by traveler i on day d from the endowment. Then we
can compute the above social welfare components: TR =
∑N
i=1 φi,d(t
dep
i,d )·pd,
RR =
∑N
i=1 ψi,d(t
dep
i,d ) ·pd, RC =
∑N
i=1 φi,d(t
dep
i,d ) ·pd, TE =
∑N
i=1 Toll
e
i,d(t
dep
i,d ) ·
pd. In addition, the paid credits by traveler i can be considered as the sum
of two components, the credits from endowment and credits bought from
the regulator, i.e., Toll(t) · Li · w = ψi,d(tdepi,d ) + Tollei,d(tdepi,d ). Based on the
considerations above, the social welfare per capita WTCS is calculated as
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follows,
WTCS =CS + TR +RR−RC + TE
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
− θi · tci,d(tdepi,d )− pd · Toll(tdepi,d ) · Li · w + i(tdepi,d )
]
+
1
N
[ N∑
i=1
φi,d(t
dep
i,d ) · pd +
N∑
i=1
ψi,d(t
dep
i,d ) · pd −
N∑
i=1
φi,d(t
dep
i,d ) · pd+
N∑
i=1
Tollei,d(t
dep
i,d ) · pd
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
− θi · tci,d(tdepi,d ) + i(tdepi,d )
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
U ′i,d(t
dep
i,d )
(15)
Note that the TCS welfare measure is equivalent to the NTE case and equals
to the combination of travel time cost and schedule deviation penalty plus
the random utility.
Our simulation captures the system model presented in Section 2 includ-
ing all detailed traveler and regulator states in the single-reservoir network
under the designed market conditions1. A simulation-based optimization
was then conducted to find the optimal credit toll scheme which leads to
the maximum the social welfare WTCS. Noted that our optimization prob-
lem has no closed-form objectives for the stochastic dynamic simulation,
that is, the objective function is an implicit function of decision variables.
Thus analytical algorithms are not applicable to our simulation-based opti-
mization problem. Furthermore, the simulation framework can be a time-
consuming process under large number of scenarios. For this reason, a
Bayesian optimization (BO) approach is adopted as it can approximate the
simulation-based objective function using few evaluations. In addition, a
Gaussian function is adopted to parameterize toll profile and decrease the
number of decision variables.
1The open source code for the simulation is available at https://github.com/
RM-Liu/MFD_TCS.
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4.2. Bayesian optimization
A BO framework essentially consists of two main steps [18]: Update
a Bayesian statistical model that approximates a complex map from the
input (i.e., the toll profile parameters: mean, variance and amplitude) to
the output (i.e., the the social welfare WTCS); determine the next input by
optimizing an acquisition function. These two steps are discussed in details
in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively.
4.2.1. Gaussian Process
Invariably, a Gaussian Process (GP), which in our case assumes the
objective function values and input points are joint distributed, is adopted in
BO. Then the GP is fully specified by its mean function µ(x) and covariance
function k(x,x′) as follows,
W (x) ∼ GP
(
µ(x), k(x,x′)
)
(16)
where x represents the input point, which is the credit toll scheme param-
eters.
To simplify the training and prediction of a GP model, the mean func-
tion µ(·) = 0 is usually adopted [46]. Let us assume we have m evalu-
ated objective values according to a space-filling design of experiment as
Dm = {x1:m,W1:m}, where x1:m = [x1,x2, . . . ,xm]T are the input points
and W1:m = [W1,W2, . . . ,Wm]
T are the corresponding objective values.
Then the joint distribution of W1:m and the inference at a candidate in-
put point xm+1, Wm+1, is as follows:[
W1:m
Wm+1
]
∼ N
(
0,
[
K k
kT k(xm+1, xm+1)
])
(17)
where k = [k(xm+1,x1), k(xm+1,x2), . . . , k(xm+1,xm)]
T , and K is the co-
variance matrix with entries Ki,j = k(xi,xj) for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
The posterior distribution of Wm+1 can be computed using Bayes’ the-
orem,
Wm+1|W1:m ∼ N
(
µ(xm+1), σ
2(xm+1)
)
(18)
where µ(xm+1) = k
TK−1W1:m and σ2(xm+1) = k(xm+1, xm+1)− kTK−1k.
The covariance function is used to measure the correlation between two
input points, that points closer in the input domain have a larger positive
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correlation and have more similar objective values [18]. In this study, we
choose the commonly used Matern kernel [35],
k(x,x′) =
21−ν
Γ(ν)
(
√
2ν ‖ x− x′ ‖)νHν(
√
2ν ‖ x− x′ ‖) (19)
where Γ(·) is the Gamma function and Hν is the modified Bessel function.
In the following numerical examples, ν = 5/2 is used for the optimization
process.
4.2.2. Acquisition function
After updating the posterior distribution over W , based on which the ac-
quisition function measures the value of the candidate input points by using
the inferred corresponding objective value and variance of the prediction.
Among the most popular acquisition functions, the upper confidence
bound (UCB) [42] is used in this study, which is written as follows:
αUCB(x; β) = µ(x) + βσ(x) (20)
where β is a hyperparameter which controls balance between exploration
and exploitation, that a larger β will lead to more exploration. Then the
next point to be evaluated can be determined by maximizing the UCB
function (20),
xm+1 = arg maxαUCB(xm+1) (21)
4.3. Experiment Design
When conducting the BO from scratch, the initial input point is usually
randomly generated from the input space, which may influence the solu-
tion quality and optimization efficiency. Then a space-filling design of the
experiment could be useful for providing a good initial input point.
In this study, one of the most popular sampling method, Latin Hyper-
cube Sampling (LHS) [36], is used to generate the initial sample points.
LHS stratifies each variable of x into m equal intervals, and draws sample
points from each sub-intervals uniformly. Compared to the Monte Carlo
method, LHS has the advantage that the sampled points are independent
without overlap, which provides a representative of the real variability.
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5. Numerical Experiments
After presenting the simulation setting in the following subsection, we
present here the results of (1) the day-to-day model properties and con-
vergence (Section 5.2) under a given credit toll profile; (2) the comparison
between the optimized TCS against the NTE (5.3); and finally (3) the com-
parison between the optimized TCS and time-of-day pricing (or CP) (5.4).
5.1. Experiment settings
The settings are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Numerical settings
Parameters Specification
Credit endowment Ii,d = 5 [credit]
Demand N1 = 3000 [traveler], N2 = 3700 [traveler]
Trip length Li = 4600 +N (0, (0.2 ∗ 4600)2) [m], Li > 0
Scale factor of trip length w = 2× 10−4
Value of time θi = 1.1 [DKK/min] [16]
Schedule deviation penalty
[
SDEi
SDLi
]
=
[
0.5
4
]
+N
([
0.052 0.12
0.12 0.42
])
SDEi ∈ [0.3, 0.7], SDLi ∈ [2.5, 5.5]
Time window parameter τ = 30
Departure time interval ∆t = 1 [min]
Network capacity njam = 4500 [vehicle]
Free flow speed vf = 9.78 [m/s]
Speed function V (n) = vf (1− nnjam )2 [m/s]
Learning parameter ω = 0.7
Function Q(p, Z) Q(p, Z) = kZ, if p > 0, Q(p, Z) = max{0, kZ}
if p = 0, where k = 2× 10−4
Toll profile function Toll(t|A, ξ, σ) = A× e−(t−ξ)
2
2σ2
This experiment considers a single-reservoir network with a capacity of
4500 travelers, with speed function adopted in Lamotte and Geroliminis [29]
and other parameters used in Yildirimoglu and Ramezani [51]. The MFD is
also characterized by the critical value of the accumulation, that can be com-
puted according to the adopted speed function, i.e., ncr = 1500 travelers.
Two demand scenarios, moderate congestion (N1 = 3000 travelers) and high
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congestion (N2 = 3700 travelers), are considered, where the critical value
of the accumulation ncr is set as the criterion for distinguishing different
demand scenarios. Specifically, if the peak accumulation of the equilibrium
state without TCS is higher than the critical value ncr, then this demand
scenario is defined as a high congestion scenario; if the peak accumulation
is smaller than ncr, then the corresponding demand scenario is defined as a
moderate congestion scenario. The profiles for the accumulation of the two
scenarios are shown in Section 5.2.
Additionally, heterogeneous travelers are captured by drawing their trip
lengths and schedule deviation penalties from three truncated Gaussian dis-
tributions, respectively. In both demand scenarios, the same distributions
are used while all other parameters are constant (see Table 2).
5.2. Day-to-day evolution process
5.2.1. Day-to-day process without TCS
In this subsection, we first focus on the equilibrium of the day-to-day
dynamics without TCS in both the moderate congestion scenario and high
congestion scenario. When the day-to-day evolution reaches an equilibrium,
the departure time decisions of all travelers remains constant across days,
i.e., the vector of the perceived generalized cost of all travelers Cd is equal
to the vector of the experienced generalized cost of all travelers cd. Then
the inconsistency between Cd and cd is used as the indicator of equilibrium.
Specifically, the L1 norm of the difference between them divided by the
number of travelers N , i.e., ‖ Cd − cd ‖1 /N , is computed to represent the
inconsistency.
Figure 1(a) presents the convergence of the perceived generalized cost
of all travelers Cd. It is found that the inconsistency becomes stable and
close to 0 after 20 days, which implies that the day-to-day evolution reaches
an equilibrium state. Figure 1(b) illustrates the evolution process of the
average consumer surplus across days, and Figure 1(c) shows the evolution
process of the social welfare per capita. These two plots show a same
curve since the social welfare equals to consumer surplus in the no toll
case. Besides, Figure 1(d) depicts the states of accumulation on different
days, where the accumulation on day 20 overlaps with that of day 49. This
also testifies that the equilibrium state is reached. Note that, as travelers
do not have perceived cost and use predetermined departure time on day 0,
the inconsistency, consumer surplus and social welfare are computed from
day 1.
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Figure 1: The evolution process of moderate congestion scenario without TCS
Moreover, we further investigate the convergence property for the high
congestion scenario. Figure 2(a) demonstrates that with the same learning
parameter ω = 0.7, the perceived generalized cost is also able to reach a
stable state but takes more days compared to that in the moderate con-
gestion scenario. Figure 2(b) and (c) present the evolution of the average
consumer surplus and social welfare per capita, respectively. By compar-
ison, we observe a lower consumer surplus and lower social welfare at the
equilibrium state due to severer congestion. In addition, Figure 2(d) shows
the changes of accumulation on different days, where the peak accumulation
at the equilibrium state exceeds the critical value ncr.
22
Figure 2: The evolution process of high congestion scenario without TCS
5.2.2. Day-to-day evolution with TCS
In this subsection, we will present the convergence and the equilibrium
properties mentioned in Section 3.2 of the day-to-day dynamics with TCS
for the moderate congestion scenario and high congestion scenario. The
parameters of the toll profile function are set as: A = 11, ξ = 18 and
σ = 80.
According to Figure 3(a)-(c), it is found that the day-to-day evolution
under a given TCS also shows a good convergence, where the system reaches
the equilibrium after 30 days. Note that the social welfare WTCS in Figure
3(c) is smaller than that in the no toll case. This is because the credit
toll scheme is not optimal but arbitrarily given, which is shown as a gray
dashed line in Figure 3(d). In addition, Figure 3(e) displays the evolution
of the credit price, which goes up from 0 [DKK] to 10.7 [DKK] first and
then decreases to the equilibrium price, which is 5.3 [DKK]. This process
is consistent with the evolution of the credit transactions shown in Figure
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3(f). At first, the number of bought credits (i.e., the credit demand) is much
higher than the number of sold credits (i.e., the credit supply), implying
that the market is short of credits and travelers need to buy extra credits
from the regulator. Thus, the credit price increases. After perceiving a
high travel cost due to the relatively expensive credit payment, travelers
adjust their departure time to avoid being charged that much, leading to a
smaller credit demand and consequently lower credit price. Finally, at the
equilibrium state, the credit supply nearly equals to the credit demand and
the correspondingly credit prices becomes stable.
Figure 3: The evolution process of moderate congestion scenario with TCS
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When applying the same toll profile to the high congestion scenario,
a similar pattern is observed in Figure 4, where the day-to-day evolution
reaches a stable state and market equilibrium with a credit price equal to
5.0 [DKK].
Figure 4: The evolution process of high congestion scenario with TCS
Next, we test the uniqueness of the credit price by setting different
initial prices and price adjustment parameter k for the moderate congestion
scenario. Similar patterns are observed in these tests for the high congestion
scenario. The results are omitted here to be succinct. Figure 5 presents the
credit price evolution with different initial prices p0 = 0, 4, 8, 12 [DKK].
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It appears that though the evolution processes are different and start from
different initial values, the credit price eventually converges to the same
level.
Figure 5: The evolution of credit price with different initial prices
In addition, let k ∈ {0.5×10−4, 1×10−4, 2×10−4}, we then examine the
influence of the price adjustment parameter on price evolution. The results
are shown in Figure 6. When k becomes larger, the credit market shows
a greater reaction to the difference between the credit demand and supply,
leading to a higher peak value and rapider change in price.
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Figure 6: The evolution of credit price with different price adjustment parameters
Moreover, we validate Hypothesis 1 by varying the credit endowment.
Under the given credit toll profile, the minimum possible endowment Imin =
1.67 and the IUE = 10.35. Note the credit endowment is identical among
all the travelers and keeps constant across days. Let I = {3, 4, . . . , 10, 11},
the results are demonstrated in Figure 7. It is clear that the credit price
monotonically decreases with I and reaches 0 when I exceeds IUE = 10.35.
27
Figure 7: The evolution of credit price with different credit endowment
5.3. Bayesian optimization results
In this subsection, we present the performance of the TCS by optimizing
the toll profile using developed BO method for both demand scenarios.
The domains of the toll profile function parameters are set as A ∈ [5, 15]
(unit: credits), ξ ∈ [30, 90] and σ ∈ [10, 50]. The initial samples are gen-
erated via the LHS consisting of 30 points. For each sample input point,
we run the day-to-day simulation and compute the travel time cost and
schedule delay cost using the average value of the last 10 days after the
equilibrium. The social welfare per capita can therefore be calculated us-
ing Equation (15). Figure 8 shows the evolution process for the moderate
congestion scenario with optimized toll profile, the parameters of which are
A = 5.6, ξ = 60.5 and σ = 16.2. It can be seen that the system becomes
stable after 135 days, and ends up with a credit price of 1.79 [DKK]. Com-
pared to the no toll case, the peak accumulation is reduced from 1226 to
1033 [traveler], which overall leads to an improvement in the social welfare,
raising from -23.3 [DKK] per capita to -22.6 [DKK] by 3.0%. We observe
from Figure 1(d) and Figure 8(d) that more travelers are departing later un-
der the optimized toll profile compared to the no toll case, in order to avoid
high credit tolls. Specifically, there are 84.4% travelers arriving at their
destinations earlier than their desired arrival time under the optimized toll
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profile, while 83.6% in the no toll case.
Figure 8: The evolution process of moderate congestion scenario with optimized TCS
Similar patterns are also observed in the high congestion scenario. The
detailed plots are omitted here to conserve space. The components of the
social welfare for the no toll case, moderate congestion and high congestion
scenarios are listed in Table 3, where the second to fifth columns are the
average monetary travel time cost (TT), schedule delay cost (SD), random
utility (RU) and social welfare (W), respectively. It can be found that, in
the moderate congestion scenario, the travel time cost per capita is reduced
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from 25.8 [DKK] to 23.7 [DKK] by 8.3%, while the schedule delay cost is
increased from 2.4 [DKK] to 3.6 [DKK] by 50.3%, and overall social welfare
per capita is improved by 3.0%. In the high congestion scenario, the average
travel time cost is reduced by 16.3%, the schedule delay cost is increased
by 21.1%, and the social welfare per capita is improved by 14.8%. It is,
therefore, concluded that when the congestion is severer, the improvement
in terms of social welfare by imposing the optimized TCS is higher.
Table 3: Comparisons among no toll case, optimized TCS and optimized CP
Scenarios TTC SD RU W
No toll case (N1) -25.8 -2.4 4.9 -23.3
Optimized TCS (N1) -23.7 -3.6 4.6 -22.6
Optimized CP (N1) -23.3 -3.9 4.6 -22.6
No toll case (N2) -32.4 -3.7 4.3 -31.9
Optimized TCS (N2) -27.2 -4.5 4.5 -27.1
Optimized CP (N2) -27.1 -4.4 4.4 -27.1
5.4. Comparison with time of day pricing
Under the time of day pricing, travelers’ behaviors are simulated based
on the same travel behavior model. The only difference is that the toll is
set in dollars instead of credits. Thus, the the experienced (or estimated)
generalized cost cCPi,d (t) for traveler i on day d departing at time t can be
written as follows:
cCPi,d (t) =− θi ·
[
Ti,d(t) + δi · SDEi ·
(
T ∗i − t− Ti,d(t)
)
+
(1− δi) · SDLi ·
(
t+ Ti,d(t)− T ∗i
)]− TollCP (t) · Li · w
=− θi · tci,d(t)− TollCP (t) · Li · w
(22)
where TollCP (t) is the toll in dollars at time t.
Similar to Section 4.1, we then define the social welfare WCP of con-
gestion pricing, which consists of consumer surplus and regulator revenue:
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WCP =CS +RR
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
− θi · tci,d(tdepi,d )− TollCP (tdepi,d ) · Li · w + i(tdepi,d )
]
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
TollCP (tdepi,d ) · Li · w
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
− θi · tci,d(tdepi,d ) + i(tdepi,d )
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
U ′i,d(t
dep
i,d )
(23)
The domains of the toll profile function parameters are slightly different
from these before and set as: A ∈ [5, 20] (unit: DKK), ξ ∈ [30, 90] and σ ∈
[10, 50]. The BO is used to optimize the toll profile, utilizing LHS sampling
method to generate initial points. Figure 9(a)-(c) show the evolution process
of moderate congestion scenario with optimized toll profile, the parameters
of which are A = 12.9, ξ = 60.7 and σ = 17.5. Compared to Figure 8(c)-(d),
time of day pricing reaches the equilibrium of social welfare and flow pattern
close to that of TCS case. Figure 9(d)-(f) present the evolution process of
high congestion scenario, with toll profile parameters A = 18.8, ξ = 60.7
and σ = 17.9. The detailed information is shown in Table 3. Then it can be
concluded that by setting proper toll profiles, which are not adaptive across
days, TCS and CP can have the same performance in terms of equilibrium
social welfare and flow pattern.
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Figure 9: The evolution process of moderate and high congestion scenarios with optimized
toll profiles
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates the day-to-day evolution of traffic flow patterns
and credit price under a TCS via both analytical and simulation approaches.
Such properties were analysed for recent generic TCS formulations, namely
[3, 6], applied to the case of area-based road traffic control and extended
for heterogeneous trip lengths, i.e. a distance-based tariff instead of access-
based tariff. The TCS here at stake relies on a daily fixed credit price,
a time-of-day varying tariff charging (or credit toll), a morning commute
32
control policy and heterogeneous decision makers (in terms of choice pref-
erences, trip length, and preferred arrival times). As for the network sim-
ulation model, we relied on the trip-based MFD [2, 12] and its efficient
implementation proposed in [28] which allowed us to efficiently study fun-
damental proprieties of the TCS. Finally we integrate this overall simulation
model with a Bayesian Optimization framework for optimizing the credit
toll charging for optimum social welfare.
Analytically, this paper presents the existence of the market and net-
work equilibrium point, the uniqueness of the credit market price and the
associated feasibility conditions. On the other hand, the numerical experi-
ments, showcase the day-to-day model properties and convergence, and the
mobility, network and welfare performances for three comparative polices:
no-control case, time-of-day pricing and the proposed TCS.
The numerical results showed good convergence on both the credit price
and network conditions demonstrating stable patterns, also sustaining the
analytical properties on price uniqueness and its inverse proportionality
with the endowment. As expected, our proposed TCS scheme improved
the social welfare compared to the no-control case and also showcased the
promised theoretical performance similarity with time-of-day pricing.
The above developments and findings contribute to the increasing body
of knowledge on mobility-related TCS both in terms of insights into the
properties of area-based TCS as well as key modelling and implementations
1 frameworks for the design of TCS closer to operations.
In the path for increased knowledge on the feasibility of TCS, our on-
going work [9] focuses on the design of TCS markets that accommodate
detailed and individual market interactions along with different buying and
selling strategies. The buying and selling behaviors are ignored in this
study, while ithey are a requirement for investigating possible market oper-
ation models in practical implementation of TCS, both from a theoretical
and empirical [6] viewpoint. In this study we also kept the TCS settings
constant within a day, namely in terms of charging, endowment, and credit
price. Adaptive credit charging, sporadic endowment and quantity con-
trol interventions by the regulator and real-time / within-day credit price
adjustment may bring TCS closer to efficient operations, especially under
the non-recurrent conditions of real transportation system. Yet, detailed
simulation and behavioural experiments approaches may again be required
to overcome the common simplifying assumptions for analytical tractabil-
ity. Nonetheless, the aforementioned findings of this paper bring insights
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into possible modelling techniques to include in the design and real-time
operations of practice ready area-wide TCS. Finally, the consideration of
additional and combined choice dimensions in future TCS efficiency analy-
sis (such as mode, route, departure time and trip cancellation) is currently
lacking in the current literature [1], yet it is in much need for bringing TCS
closer to practice .
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
This proof begins with
Lemma 1 Ci and p solve
Q(p, Z) = 0 (A.1)
iff
p = [p+ ρ · Z]+ (A.2)
where ρ is a constant larger than 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Sufficiency: from (8), Eq. (A.1) holds iff
p · Z = 0, p ≥ 0, Z ≤ 0 (A.3)
If Ci and p satisfy (A.3), then either
p = 0, Z ≤ 0 (A.4)
or
p ≥ 0, Z = 0 (A.5)
holds. Obviously, (A.4) and (A.5) satisfy (A.2)
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Necessity: if Ci and p satisfy (A.2), then either{
p = 0,
ρ · Z ≤ 0 (A.6)
or {
p > 0,
Z = 0
(A.7)
holds. And as (A.6) and (A.7) satisfy (A.3), then (A.1) holds. Therefore,
Lemma 1 holds. 
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 1, the equilibrium condition (11) is
equivalent to{
Ci(t) = θi · tci + p · Toll(t) · Li · w
p = [p+ ρ · Z]+
(A.8)
Then, we introduce the fixed point theorem from [26]:
Theorem A 1 Let Ω be a bounded closed convex subset of Rm and let g :
Ω→ Ω be continuous. Then g has a fixed point.
Since travel cost tci(t), p and Toll(t) are non-negative and continuous, we
can conclude that Ci(t) is non-negative and continuous. Then there exists
y = (y1, . . . , ym)
T ≥ 0, such that 0 ≤ C(t, p) ≤ y. Therefore, a compact
and convex set can be defined as ΩC = [0, y1] × · · · × [0, ym], then for all
C ∈ ΩC , θ · tc+ p · w · Toll ·L ∈ ΩC .
Denote Zd =
∑
i Toll(t
dep
i,d ) · Li · w − Ii,d ·N , then
lim
p→∞
Zd(C, p) = lim
p→∞
∑
i
Toll(tdepi,d ) · Li · w − Ii,d ·N
=(Imin − I)N < 0, ∀C ∈ ΩC
(A.9)
For some Cˆ ∈ ΩC , if
Z(Cˆ, p) ≤ 0,∀p ≥ 0 (A.10)
then [p + ρZ(Cˆ, p)]+ ≤ p,∀p ≥ 0. Let us define Ω−C as the set of Cˆ ∈ ΩC
satisfying condition (A.10) and define Ω+C = ΩC\Ω−C . Then there exists
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Cˆ ∈ Ω+C , such that Z(Cˆ, p) > 0 for some p ≥ 0. According to (A.9)
and (A.10), there exists p¯ ≥ 0, such that Z(Cˆ, p¯) ≤ 0, ∀p ≥ p¯ ⇒ [p +
ρZ(Cˆ, p)]+ ≤ p,∀p ≥ p¯. Let p+ = maxp≤p¯[p + ρZ(Cˆ, p)]+, then ∀p ∈
[0, p+], [p + ρZ(Cˆ, p)]+ ≤ p+. Therefore ∀p ∈ Ωp , [0,maxCˆ∈Ω+C p
+] and
C ∈ ΩC , [p+ ρZ(Cˆ, p)]+ ∈ Ωp.
Based on the analysis above, ΩC × Ωp is compact and convex. Since
travel cost tc(·), [·] and Toll(·) are continuous, then by Theorem 1, (A.8)
has at least one fixed point, implying that there exists at least one one
equilibrium point of the proposed dynamic system. 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume there are two equilibrium credit prices p1
and p2, then by (6) and (8), we have
p1
[∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p1) · Li · w − Ii,d ·N
]
= 0, p1 ≥ 0,
p2
[∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p2) · Li · w − Ii,d ·N
]
= 0, p2 ≥ 0,∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p1) · Li · w − Ii,d ·N ≤ 0,∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p2) · Li · w − Ii,d ·N ≤ 0
(B.1)
Thus,
(p1 − p2)
(∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p1) · Li · w −
∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p2) · Li · w
)
= p1
∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p1) · Li · w − p1
∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p2) · Li · w
+ p2
∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p2) · Li · w − p2
∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p1) · Li · w
= p1
[
Ii,d ·N −
∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p2) · Li · w
]
+ p2
[
Ii,d ·N −
∑
i
Toll(tdepi,p1) · Li · w
]
≥ 0
(B.2)
By (12), the equality in (B.2) holds if and only if p1 = p2. Hence, the
equilibrium credit price is unique. 
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